Argument for Southwest:
District court reasoning:
Ecen though the language in the residual clause to § 1 of the FAA is broad, the Supreme Court has adopted a narrow construction of “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109. It arrived at this conclusion by employing the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, which instructs that “[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”
The district court held that “the linchpin for classification as a transportation worker … is actual transportation, not merely handling goods.”
The district court drew a distinction between “nonexempt workers who handle goods in service of transportation (warehousemen, stevedores, and porters)” and “exempt workers who actually transport [goods] by navigating the channels of interstate commerce (truckers, seamen, and railroadsmen, respectively).” Id. at 38a.
Ms. Saxon “merely worked in a transportation- adjacent industry or position, but did not physically transport goods at all, let alone out-of-state,” so she does not qualify for the exemption. Id. at 39a.
Precedent: in Borgonia v. G2 Secure Staff,
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that postal workers as a class fall within the FAA’s exemption for workers engaged in interstate commerce, seemingly regardless of whether the workers in question transport (as opposed to merely handle) mail. But both of these cases predate Circuit City and neither case uses the “transportation worker” framework.
The court noted a “growing consensus/trend that handlers are not transportation workers” and such an interpretation was consistent with the “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Id. at 39a-40a
Example cases:
Furlough v. Capstone Logistics, LLC, No. 18-cv- 02990-SVK, 2019 WL 2076723, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (holding that warehouse worker whose job duties included “loading, unloading, and handling freight” was not a transportation worker);
Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952, 958-59 (D. Md. 1994) (finding that warehouse workers who load and unload trucks used to deliver goods in interstate commerce are not exempt).
Saxon ends this trend, guiding courts instead in the opposite direction.
ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction: the exclusion for seamen— a term which it understood not to cover the longshoreman who loaded and unloaded ships—and ex-tended that logic to warehousemen, stevedores, porters, and to Saxon’s analogous role as a ramp supervisor.
“[T]ransportation workers are those who are ‘actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.’” Id. at 801 (citing Kienstra Precast, 702 F.3d at 956). Therefore, loading and unloading cargo is not enough to make a worker engaged in commerce because that phrase refers only to “actual transportation.”
Counter argument: (circuit court reasoning) Actual transportation is not limited to the precise moment either goods or the people accompanying them cross state lines. Loading and unloading cargo onto a vehicle so that it may be moved interstate, too, is actual transportation, and those who performed that work were recognized in 1925 to be engaged in commerce. Indeed, one year earlier, the Supreme Court held it was “too plain to require discussion that the loading or unloading of an interstate shipment by the employees of a carrier is so closely related to interstate transportation as to be practically a part of it” and thus a person injured while unloading cargo from a train was employed in commerce. Balt. & Ohio Sw. R.R. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540, 544 (1924).
Southwest Claim:
Precedents:
Eastus v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 960 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2020): The Fifth Circuit held last year that an airport agent supervisor who shared nearly identical duties with Ms. Saxon, including occasionally handling baggage at the airport, was not a transportation worker. Eastus, 960 F.3d at 212. As the Fifth Circuit explained, “[l]oading or unloading a [vehicle] with goods prepares the goods for or removes them from transportation” but is not itself transportation. In reaching its decision, the court explained that the “key question” turns on the type of work that the worker was hired to perform. Id. at 209. In answering this question, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the worker’s “job required her to engage in the movement of goods in interstate commerce” or engage in the “aircraft’s actual movement in interstate commerce.” Id. at 210, 212 (internal citation omitted). The court held the supervisor’s occasional handling of passenger baggage “could at most be construed as loading and unloading airplanes.”
local food delivery and rideshare drivers who transport people and goods that have traveled interstate are not exempt. See Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 20-16030, 2021 WL 3282092 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021) (Uber driver not exempt); see also Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2020) (local food delivery driver not exempt); In re Grice, 974 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2020) (Uber driver not exempt).
In Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit explained that supervisors generally are not exempt, but recognized an exception for managers who directly supervise truckers delivering goods interstate. See id. at 592-93. In recognizing this exception, the Third Circuit did not intend to create a “slippery slope” that would “lead to the exemption of all management employees,” explaining the plaintiff in that case “was a direct supervisor of [truck] drivers that transported packages” and it was “her particular relations to the channels of interstate commerce” that made her a transportation worker. The court explicitly limited its holding to exclude warehouse managers who load and unload goods (and are virtually identical to Ms. Saxon) because they do not direct the interstate shipment of goods or manipulate the channels of commerce themselves.
the Fifth Circuit, in Eastus v. ISS Facility Services, Inc., 960 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2020), longshoremen were not an exempted class of workers. Id. at 211-12. The appellant, Heidi Eastus, supervised and assisted airport ticketing and gate agents who placed passengers’ baggage on conveyor belts to be screened and loaded. Id. at 208. Because her work could “at most be construed as loading and unloading airplanes,” she resembled more a longshoreman than a seaman, so the court held she was also not exempt. Id. at 212.
Counter argument:the analysis rested on a decision interpreting the term “seaman” under § 1 and expressly disclaiming reliance on the residual clause. Longshoremen may not belong to the enumerated class of seamen, but it cannot follow that one is not a transportation worker just because she is not a seaman. The residual clause must have some content beyond just the enumerated categories, lest we read it out of the statute entirely.
Social Impact:
Argument for Saxon
Circuit Court Reasoning:
The act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as that term was understood at the time of the Arbitration Act’s enactment in 1925. Airplane cargo loaders, as a class, are engaged in that commerce, in much the way that seamen and railroad employees were, and Saxon and the ramp supervisors are members of that class.
To resolve whether a worker engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, court ask “whether the interstate movement of goods is a central part of the class members’ job description,” meaning that the workers are actively occupied in “the enterprise of moving goods across interstate lines.” Wallace, 970 F.3d at 801-02.
Counter argument: If the residual clause applies to anyone related to interstate commerce—words not actually found in the exemption or in this Court’s precedent—it potentially applies to any worker performing any job in the country; an extraordinary result that this Court has previously rejected.
From the perspective of ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction:
Seamen, stevedores, and longshoremen performed similar—even if not identical—work. Given this similarity in their work we see no reason to infer that Congress’s express inclusion of seamen in § 1 leads to an implied exclusion of longshoremen or other cargo loaders like them. They are all workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, even if they are not the same class.
Even if a gap existed in the analogy between seamen and cargo loaders, In terms of “railroad employees,” the Supreme Court has noted that the term “may have swept more broadly at the time of the Act’s passage than might seem obvious today.” New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543.
In the absence of other guidance, Saxon proposes the term should be understood by its plain meaning—those employed by a railroad, obviously including porters and other train cargo loaders.
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 2, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60), allowed railroad workers injured while “employed … in … commerce” to sue the railroad for negligence. This formulation overlaps with § 1 of the Arbitration Act, the Third Circuit. The Supreme Court later relied on FELA caselaw to inform its interpretation of § 1 decades ago in Circuit City. See Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc). —–so we want rely on FELA to interpret this!!!!!The FELA cases identify two general categories of workers employed in interstate commerce, beyond the obvious worker who physically crosses state lines. The first category included those who worked on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey. See, e.g., Phila. & Reading Ry. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284, 285-86 (1920). The First and Ninth Circuits recently relied on this line of cases to conclude that so-called “last mile” delivery drivers fit within the § 1 exemption. See Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 912; Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 20-21. The second category: Cargo loaders fit cleanly into the second category—those whose work was “so closely related to [interstate transportation] as to be practically a part of it.” Shanks v. Del., Lackawanna & W.R.R., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1916).
Counter argument: Southwest protests only we should not rely on FELA to interpret the Arbitration Act because they have different purpose: FELA is construed liberally to effect a remedial purpose, but the Arbitration Act is to favor arbitration. Otherwise, Southwest fears a slippery slope— excluding ramp supervisors could eventually lead to excluding ticket and gate agents, security guards, taxi drivers, and airport vendors all on the ground that each supports the work of the airline.
Counter: no reason to believe that FELA’s purpose impact its definition of “employees engaging in commerce”. And no sli[pery slope: to say that this closely related work is interstate transportation does not necessarily mean that the work of a ticketing or gate agents (like in Eastus) or others even further removed from that moment qualify too.
The previous analysis about how the term “seaman” and “railroad employee” imply about cargo loaders lies on the premise that common characteristics of seamen and railroad employees is their relationship with interstate or foreign commerce.
Counter: Southwest asserts that the link between seamen and railroad employees is that both were subject to alternative dispute-resolution schemes in 1925. The purpose of the § 1 exemption in the Arbitration Act, it contends, was to avoid conflict with such schemes, including the Railway Labor Act. See Circuit City, 552 U.S. at 120- 21 (calling this purpose a “permissible inference”). Because Saxon is not covered by the Railway Labor Act, she cannot be exempt from the Arbitration Act.
Counter: the text of § 1 does not tie exemption to any other law. The text directs us to ask whether the class of workers is engaged in commerce. Even if Southwest correctly identifies the purpose of § 1, “[p]urpose cannot override text.” Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 25 (citing New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543). If Congress intended to exempt only workers covered by dispute-resolution schemes in 1925, it could have enumerated them and skipped the residual exemption entirely.
Saxon Claim:
Relying on Lenz v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 2005), Saxon maintained that she was a transportation worker because Southwest was a transportation company, and she was responsible for loading and unloading goods for transportation.—-this is weak!!!!!! Even circuit court denies it
Counter argument: Southwest claimed that it is not a transportation company, even though it is, the job nature of Saxon is not transporting goods. (Southwest replied that Saxon fell outside the exemption because she did not personally move goods across state lines or manage those who do.)
Saxon argues that ramp supervisors, and cargo loaders more broadly, are transportation workers within the original meaning of § 1 at the time it was enacted in 1925. Almost a century ago, those who loaded cargo for interstate transport were recognized to be engaged in commerce. She also draws parallels between her job loading cargo as a ramp supervisor and the 1925 definitions of seamen and railroad employees, which in her view covered boat and train cargo loaders.
Southwest is engaged in commerce. And, Saxon contends, suggesting that the proper class of workers parallel to seamen and railroad employees is “airline employees.” She defines that group simply enough: those employed by an airline, a class of which she is obviously a part. —-this is weak!!! Circuit court denies it
Counter argument: Although this view draws a bright and clear line, it is inconsistent with the text of the residual exemption. The phrase “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” asks that the class of workers, not their employer, be engaged in commerce. This feature cuts both ways. On the one hand, a transportation worker need not work for a transportation company. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC, 702 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 2012). But on the other hand, a person does not become a transportation worker just by working for a transportation company. See Lenz, 431 F.3d at 351; Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated 294 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (joint stipulation to dismiss); Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Ramp supervisors are not transportation workers just because they work for Southwest.
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